Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the Future of Transsubstantive Procedure by Burbank, Stephen B.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2010 
Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the Future of Transsubstantive 
Procedure 
Stephen B. Burbank 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Litigation Commons, Policy History, Theory, and Methods 
Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Repository Citation 
Burbank, Stephen B., "Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the Future of Transsubstantive Procedure" 
(2010). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 489. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/489 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
9-BURBANK_WESTERN 11/9/2010 1:15 PM 
 
1189 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLEADING, AND THE FUTURE OF 
TRANSSUBSTANTIVE PROCEDURE 
Stephen B. Burbank  
Summary judgment and pleading under the Federal Rules offer 
numerous opportunities for comparison.  Having spent much of the last 
six years studying, writing about, and seeking to influence public policy 
concerning these two legs of what the Advisory Committee recently 
referred to as a three-legged stool
1
—discovery being the third—lately 
(that is, after the Court‟s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
2
 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal
3
) I have been struck by the extent to which they 
have been assimilated doctrinally and concerned about the extent to 
which they may exhibit the same patterns of disuniform geographical 
and substantive activity and impact.  I have also been gratified that, as 
applied to summary judgment and pleading, realism about the power of 
procedure, facilitated by more frequent and sophisticated empirical study 
of procedural phenomena, may at last cause a widespread reexamination 
of the premises, as well as the costs and benefits, of transsubstantive 
procedure. 
My research on the drafting history of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (“Rule 
56”) revealed that, because of the models available to them, the original 
Advisory Committee thought that the rule would prove useful chiefly for 
plaintiffs seeking to collect debts.
4
  In the succeeding seventy years, 
 
 © Stephen B. Burbank 2010.  David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School.  This article is based on remarks made at the 2010 meeting 
of the AALS Section on Litigation. 
 1. Memorandum from Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 21 (May 9, 2008) [hereinafter Kravitz Memorandum] (explaining that the “three-legged 
stool” consists of notice pleading, discovery, and summary judgment), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV_Report.pdf. 
 2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 3. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 4. Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: 
Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 592 (2004). 
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summary judgment has become something very different from what 
those who introduced it into federal practice envisioned.
5
  It is invoked 
far more by defendants than by plaintiffs;
6
 it is by no means invoked 
only in simple cases,
7
 and it accounts for a much higher percentage of 
terminations in federal civil cases than do trials.
8
  There is nothing 
necessarily wrong with these developments, particularly if one 
acknowledges the propriety of judges dusting off old tools and reshaping 
them to deal with problems not foreseen by their creators. 
Yet, my inquiries and those of other scholars suggest a number of 
problems that have occurred in the enthusiastic embrace of a long-
neglected litigation equilibration device that started in the 1970s.  One is 
the fact that Rule 56, although superficially uniform, is differently 
interpreted in different circuits and in different types of cases, a 
phenomenon that may help to account for differences in the rates at 
which it is invoked, and at which cases are terminated by summary 
judgment, in different parts of the country and in different categories of 
cases.
9
  Another problem is suggested by evidence that some courts are 
granting summary judgment by resort to techniques of factual and legal 
 
(explaining that the rule was inspired by English procedure instituted for the benefit of plaintiffs 
seeking to collect debts with dispatch). 
 5. Proponents of Rule 56 looked at it as a tool to identify and dispose of claims where there 
was no valid defense without the time and expense of a trial.  See Burbank, supra note 4, at 598-99 
(quoting Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 872-
73 (1933)).  Charles Clark, one of summary judgment‟s chief advocates, wondered whether 
summary judgment motions should be attempted outside of “the simple case where there really isn‟t 
much of a defense” and worried that its use in other cases would be “an instrument of delay.”  
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 
225 (1938) (remarks of Dean Clark). 
 6. See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal 
District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 886 (2007) (explaining that the data showed 
some 2526 motions were made by defendants while only 967 were made by plaintiffs). 
 7. See Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Hon. Michael 
Baylson 6-8 (Nov. 2, 2007) (showing that summary judgment motions are filed in complex actions, 
such as those involving insurance contracts, products liability, antitrust, civil RICO, and ERISA), 
available at www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/insumjre.pdf/$file/insumjre.pdf. 
 8. See Burbank, supra note 4, at 616 (presenting Eastern District of Pennsylvania data 
showing that during fiscal year 2000, 4.1 percent of civil cases were terminated by summary 
judgment while only 1.9 percent were terminated at or after trial). 
 9. See Burbank, supra note 4, at 618; Cecil et al., supra note 6, at 896 (noting that the “six 
district courts in this study vary greatly in their levels of summary judgment activity”); Cecil et al., 
supra note 6, at 906 (“Criticism of summary judgment rarely takes into account the widely varying 
incidence of motions across various types of cases and the marked differences in summary 
judgment practices across individual federal district courts.”). 
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carving that threaten the right to jury trial and the integrity of the 
substantive law.
10
 
The pleading in the Advisory Committee‟s three-legged stool was 
so-called “notice pleading.”
11
  What a difference a year makes.  
Endangered by the Court‟s decision in Twombly, notice pleading has 
been put on life support by Iqbal.  The three-legged stool of yore is a 
very different looking piece of furniture.  The process used to 
accomplish this, moreover, was not that of “dusting off . . . and 
reshaping,” as with summary judgment.
12
  There, the courts altered a few 
of the federal common law standards that implement Rule 56, and gave 
vitamins to some others—in order to meet the perceived challenges of 
modern litigation, to be sure, but all in aid of the historic function of 
separating wheat from chaff by identifying those cases with sufficient 
factual support to warrant submission to a jury.  In Twombly and Iqbal, 
by contrast, the Court ignored the requirements of the Enabling Act and 
its own prior decisions on the difference between judicial interpretation 
and judicial amendment.
13
  Moreover, disdaining or fundamentally 
misapprehending the historic role of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“Rule 
12(b)(6)”)—which was intended to test whether the substantive law 
authorizes relief to one in the plaintiff‟s situation under any set of 
facts—and the analytically distinct role of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) (“Rule 
12(e)”),
14
 the Twombly Court did not just retire the “no set of facts” 
 
 10. See Burbank, supra note 4, at 624-25; Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the 
Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. 
L. REV. 203, 229-31 (1993). 
 11. Kravitz Report, supra note 1, at 64. 
 12. See Memorandum from Steve Burbank to Mike Baylson and Lee Rosenthal 1-2 (Jan. 20, 
2007) (on file with author). 
 13. “[W]e are bound to follow [a Federal Rule] as we understood it upon its adoption,  
and . . . we are not free to alter it except through the process prescribed by Congress in the Rules 
Enabling Act.”  Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999); see also Amchem Products, 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“Courts are not free to amend a rule outside the process 
Congress ordered.”). 
 14. The architecture of Iqbal’s mischief—undoubtedly a major source of regret for the 
author of the Twombly decision, who dissented in Iqbal—is clear.  The foundation is the Court‟s 
mistaken conflation of the question of the legal sufficiency of a complaint, which is tested under 
Rule 12(b)(6), with the question of its sufficiency to provide adequate notice to the defendant, 
which is tested under Rule 12(e).  Conley’s “no set of facts” language concerned the former 
question, not the latter, with the result that even if post-Conley courts were technically correct in 
invoking that language when denying 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, the same courts could have 
granted Rule 12(e) motions for more definite statement (had defendants made them and had the 
complaints in fact provided inadequate notice).  Although the Twombly Court “retired” the “no set 
of facts” language, it did not retire, but rather perpetuated and exacerbated, this mistake.  Whether 
the Supreme Court has Limited Americans’ Access to Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
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language in Conley v. Gibson.
15
  Fulfilling the fondest dreams of lower 
courts that, rebuffed in attempts to impose fact pleading directly, had 
found ways to do so indirectly,
16
 the Twombly Court substituted for the 
self-inflicted confusion of those lower courts the conflation of Rules 
12(b)(6) and 12(e).
17
 
Iqbal made what could have been merely an isolated aberration into 
a general repudiation of the original understanding of the Federal Rules 
on pleading and motions to dismiss, one that makes Rule 12(b)(6) 
another factual screening device, albeit a notably capricious one, and 
Rule 12(e) essentially irrelevant.  As noted, the Conley Court‟s use of 
the “no set of facts” language was intended to address only those 
situations in which, no matter how compelling the facts alleged, the law 
did not provide relief.  That is a far cry from the power to assess the 
plausibility of recovery under an accepted theory of relief. 
It is too early to tell what the impact of Iqbal will be; we have very 
limited data.  The most comprehensive study to date, an analysis (using 
econometric techniques) of some 1200 cases by Professor Patricia 
Hatamyar, although subject to the biases that afflict work based on 
published decisions, is probably the best we have for now.
18
  It suggests 
that what I have called “the usual victims of „procedural‟ reform” are 
being differentially and adversely affected by Twombly and especially 
 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (2009) (prepared statement of Stephen B. Burbank) [hereinafter Burbank 
Testimony], available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%20Burbank% 20Testimony.pdf. 
 15. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (holding that a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it is established that the plaintiff can prove “no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”). 
 16. Apparently persuaded that an invigorated summary judgment procedure—already 
embraced by many lower federal courts starting in the 1970‟s and blessed by the Supreme Court in 
the mid-1980‟s—was not a sufficient response to contemporary litigation ills, a number of lower 
federal courts performed a similar operation on the pleading rules.  Notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court‟s embrace of notice pleading and the listing of only a few matters requiring greater factual 
specificity in Federal Rule 9(b), some courts determined that certain types of cases should be 
subject to heightened pleading requirements.  In its Swierkiewicz and Leatherman decisions, one a 
civil rights case and the other an employment discrimination case, the Supreme Court twice within a 
decade rejected such judge-made rules as inconsistent with the Federal Rules and with the principle 
that Federal Rules can be changed only through the Enabling Act process or by statute.  Apparently 
the message was lost on, or simply unacceptable to, some lower federal courts, as the technique 
persisted even after Swierkiewicz.  By this time it bordered on lawlessness.  Burbank Testimony, 
supra note 14, at 6. 
 
 17. Burbank Testimony, supra note 14; Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of 
“General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 551 (2009) (suggesting that the plausibility requirement 
has little to do with Rule 12(b)(6) and everything to do with Rule 12(e)). 
 18. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 555-56 (2010). 
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Iqbal.
19
  Thus, she concluded that “[m]otions to dismiss [in 
constitutional civil rights cases] were granted at a higher rate (53%) than 
in all cases combined (49%), and the rate 12(b)(6) motions were granted 
in those cases increased from Conley (50%) to Twombly (55%) to Iqbal 
(60%).”
20
 
Ongoing work by the Federal Judicial Center that is based on actual 
docket entries will eventually clarify the empirical picture.  I would be 
surprised if we did not see substantially different rates of activity across 
the country, as well as in different kinds of cases.  That, after all, has 
been the experience with Rule 56, which in turn was very similar to the 
experience with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 during the decade between 1983 and 
1993.
21
  It is the experience one would expect knowing both that in some 
parts of the country, as I observed, Iqbal answered “the fondest dreams” 
of some lower courts and that district judges in other parts of the country 
are ignoring Iqbal—cubing a process of lawlessness that started with 
lower courts subverting Conley and continued with the Court subverting 
the Enabling Act.
22
  It is also what one would expect knowing that the 
Iqbal Court‟s reliance on “judicial experience and common sense”
23
 is, 
in certain types of cases, an invitation to “cognitive illiberalism” more 
worrisome than when summary judgment is involved.
24
  At least in the 
latter situation, judicial subjectivity is disciplined by an evidentiary 
record created after discovery.
25
  No such constraint operates when a 
judge assesses the plausibility of a complaint in connection with a 
 
 19. Burbank Testimony, supra note 14, at 3. 
 20. Hatamyar, supra note 18, at 556. 
 21. See Burbank, supra note 4, at 618. 
 22. Stephen B. Burbank, Time Out, in Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule 
Twombly and Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 148 (2009) (arguing that the process the 
Supreme Court used to change the standards courts should use in evaluating motions to dismiss was 
“illegitimate and inadequate” in light of the Rules Enabling Act of 28 U.S.C. § 2072). 
 23. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (explaining that “[d]etermining whether 
a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”). 
 24. Cognitive illiberalism is demonstrated in cases where the court, by insisting that a case 
be decided summarily, denies those citizens who see the facts differently an opportunity, in jury 
deliberations, to “inform and possibly change the view of citizens endowed with a different 
perspective.”  Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the 
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841-42 (2009).  It also makes the decision 
illegitimate in the eyes of any subcommunities whose members see the facts in a different way.  See 
id. at 842.  See also Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American 
Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 117-18 (2009) (applying cognitive illiberalism analysis to pleading 
under Twombly and Iqbal). 
 25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) states that summary judgment should be granted if “the 
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact.” 
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motion to dismiss.
26
  Finally, how could it be otherwise, given the 
example of ad hoc manipulation of the substantive law, arbitrary 
complaint carving, and equally arbitrary inference carving according to 
“judicial experience and common sense” that the Iqbal Court has 
provided to the lower courts? 
If there is a silver lining here—other than the possibility that the 
Court‟s contempt for both the Enabling Act process and the original 
understanding of the Federal Rules that it had previously pledged to 
honor when operating outside of that process may prompt Congress to 
enact remedial legislation—it is that Twombly and Iqbal have vividly 
highlighted the costs of transsubstantive procedure.
27
  Now that even 
Congress has learned how to use procedure, openly or not, to advance 
substantive goals, greater attention naturally focuses on choices made by 
those responsible for crafting and interpreting procedural rules, wherever 
they sit.  Yet, the foundational assumption that the Enabling Act requires 
transsubstantive rules
28
 is thought to prevent use of its process when a 
particular substantive context requires a different procedural rule, while 
the judiciary„s refusal to acknowledge that statutory procedure is 
legitimate prevents it from taking the initiative in seeking a legislative 
fix.
29
  As a result, courts struggle to make a substance-specific solution 
fit within the general rule, or they change the general rule without 
admitting that they are doing so.  The tendency of the first tactic is to 
yield a non-optimal solution for the particular substantive context.  The 
tendency of the second, the technique used in Twombly and Iqbal, is to 
yield a non-optimal solution for all substantive contexts.  I would not be 
surprised if the near future brought legislation that authorized the rules 
committees of the Judicial Conference to propose substance-specific 
 
 26. A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) may be made before any responsive 
pleading is filed, let alone before any discovery is conducted. 
 27. Under transsubstantive procedure the same procedural rules apply regardless of the 
substance of the case.  See generally David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-
Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371 (2010). 
 28. See Burbank, supra note 17, at 536 (explaining foundational assumption that the Federal 
Rules should be uniformly applicable in all federal courts and in all federal cases). 
 29. See id. at 562.  Note the recent exception in amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 502, proposed 
as legislation by the judiciary and enacted by Congress.  See Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537 
(2008); S. Rep. No. 110-264, at 4 (2008), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ 
cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_reports&docid=f:sr264.110.pdf (“On December 11, 2007, 
Chairman Leahy introduced S. 2450, incorporating the language proposed by the Judicial 
Conference's Advisory Committee.”).  Because, however, the amendments govern attorney-client 
privilege, the judiciary had no choice by reason of the Enabling Act's requirement that any “rule 
creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless 
approved by Act of Congress.”  28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2006). 
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rules when necessary to solve this dilemma, effective, however, only if 
enacted by Congress. 
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